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Dispute Resolution: Raising the Bar 
and Enlarging the Canon 
Introduction 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow 
The articles which follow were prepared for the AALS 2003 Workshop on 
Dispute Resolution: Raising the Bar and Enlarging the Canon. The committee 
that planned the workshop sought to explore how the field of dispute resolu-
tion (born of courses in negotiation, mediation, and "alternative" dispute 
resolution) has expanded its focus in the last twenty years, both in disciplinary 
breath and scope and in subject matters taught. Twenty-one years earlier the 
first AALS Workshop on Dispute Resolution, held at Harvard Law School, 
sought to launch the field, define issues for research and exploration, and 
demonstrate multiple means of teaching its theoretical and practical knowl-
edge for modern lawyers. 
The 2003 workshop focused on how the field has expanded to embrace a 
wide variety of disciplines that inform law from outside, including economics, 
psychology, sociology, and philosophy, and how new issues of concern have 
emerged-including the roles of emotions, culture, cognition, ethics, and 
mindfulness-in the teaching and practice of what lawyers do when they 
attempt to resolve or handle disputes or negotiate transactions. The workshop 
was designed to focus on the past, present, and future of research and 
teaching issues in the field, not only for those teachers and scholars already in 
the field, but also for those in contiguous subjects, such as civil procedure, 
contracts, property, constitutional law, and clinics. 
The articles published here were all presented at plenary sessions of the 
workshop. My article, which began the workshop, reflects on the modem 
history of the treatment of dispute handling as a legal process, now studied as 
the more multidisciplinary field of "conflict resolution," suggesting that legal 
educators and scholars must broaden their conceptions of what is relevant to 
human dispute and transaction "handling," both in questions conceptualized 
and in how dispute resolution is "operationalized" in teaching and practice. 
Jennifer Gerarda Brown explores the insights derived from economics gener-
ally and law and economics more specifically in terms of individual judgments, 
cognitive distortions and inefficiencies, and the surprising and often 
counterintuitive patterns of behaviors that occur when people seek to resolve 
disputes or effectuate deals in strategic interactions. Howard Gadlin explores 
Journal of Legal Education, Volume 54, Number 1 (March 2004) 
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other counterintuitive findings from social science research that explores why 
and how people choose to dispute with each other: Why do so many young 
people continue to smoke although cigarette smoking is declared unhealthy? 
Why do some people (lawyers?) continue to enjoy disputes and conflicts as we 
develop more and more methods of seeking good solutions to legal disputes 
that the parties can consent to? Chris Guthrie and Nancy Welsh explore 
contributions to dispute processing from two different sides of social psychol-
ogy-cognitive errors we make that undermine our notions of "rational" 
decision making, and the power of "fair" processes to make us believe in 
process, regardless of whether we win or lose, derived from empirical study of 
a field called procedural justice. 
A second series of papers illustrates how applications of different disci-
plines and knowledge bases should affect the teaching and practice of dispute 
resolution, particularly in modern law schools. Pat Chew explores the role of 
both culture and "multiculturalism" in disputes that involve actors from 
"different" world views. Leonard Riskin examines how mindfulness and the 
practices of deep consciousness and reflection can make better dispute resolv-
ers, lawyers, and human beings. Scott Peppet analyzes some of the many 
ethical dilemmas facing third-party neutrals and second-party negotiators as 
they try to be effective problem solvers for those in dispute or conflict. 
The symposium also includes an article which was not presented at the 
workshop, but which illustrates the concerns of workshop sessions directed 
explicitly to teaching issues-Michael Moffitt's article on different forms of 
student performance evaluations in negotiation courses. Frank Sander-for 
many of us the father of dispute resolution teaching and research in the law 
schools-concludes the symposium and reflects on where the field has been, 
where it is going, and what it offers by way of legal change and transformation 
for law, legal studies, and legal institutions. 
The workshop itself explored a wide variety of issues demonstrating that 
both quality and subject matter of issues directly related to dispute resolution 
have expanded to include such areas as multiparty dispute resolution, the role 
of special masters in complex disputes, procedural and social justice in dis-
pute resolution, systems design, mass torts, arbitration pedagogy, conducting 
and using empirical research and evaluation studies, the role oflaw in dispute 
resolution, the collaborative law movement, and the roles of ethics and 
emotions in negotiation and mediation. The message from these articles 
should be clear for legal academics: how human beings learn to live together 
by managing their conflicts-planning and executing the transactions and 
deals and trust of their relationships, both commercial and familial-is no 
longer a matter of simply studying legal doctrine and procedure. Learning 
about dispute and conflict resolution and making transactions happen impli-
cate many disciplines, which should spur us on to consider more varied ways 
of teaching. 
Members of the planning committee of the workshop, responsible for 
bringing you these rich articles, were Leonard Riskin, chair, University of 
Missouri-Columbia; Carol Liebman, Columbia University;JamesAlfini, North-
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ern Illinois University; Gerald Williams, Brigham Young University; and James 
Coben, Hamline University. They had assistance from Chistopher Honeyman, 
a national expert in dispute processes in a wide variety of fields, who served as 
consultant to the committee. Through the good offices of Gerald Williams, 
many of the papers presented at the workshop are collected here for your 
reading pleasure and-more important-to inspire you to "raise the bar and 
enlarge the canon" of your own teaching, whether in dispute resolution 
courses or in any law school course which considers how human beings come 
together or fall apart. 
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From Legal Disputes to Conflict 
Resolution and Human Problem 
Solving: Legal Dispute Resolution in a 
Multidisciplinary Context 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow 
Legal Process, Conflict, and Justice 
Although this essay traces my own intellectual journey as a teacher and 
scholar of "alternative dispute resolution," it describes as well the evolution of 
the field of dispute resolution (rooted in legal studies) to the now broader 
field of conflict resolution that encompasses the study of disputes and con-
flicts, not only when they "come to law" in legal disputes, but in all forms of 
human conflict, including the interpersonal, domestic, and international. 
While my work began in legal disputing, it quickly moved to the more interdis-
ciplinary study of conflict resolution when I sought better solutions to human 
problems than those afforded by courts or unprincipled compromises in 
conventional negotiation processes. 
Several important themes have emerged as dispute resolution in law has 
expanded to include the fuller study of human conflict situations. First, 
although necessary and important in some cases, conventional legal pro-
cesses, like adjudication and adversarial negotiation, are often inadequate for 
a fuller satisfaction of human needs and interests, and so we must look to 
other processes than traditional institutions or practices, depending on the 
kind of conflict or dispute at issue. With a growing availability of different 
kinds of processes for different kinds of matters, we are also developing a 
broader array of "process institutions." This is "process pluralism" and should 
expand the focus of what is studied in law and jurisprudence. Second, while 
much of my work could be characterized as "procedural" or "process" driven, 
I am also concerned with exploring where our substantive solutions to human 
problems come from and how we can improve upon the human repertoire for 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow is a professor at the Georgetown University Law Center and director of 
the Georgetown-Hewlett Program in Conflict Resolution and Legal Problem Solving. 
This essay is the basis of the plenary talk delivered at the Workshop on Dispute Resolution: 
Raising the Bar and Enlarging the Canon at the 2003 annual meeting of the AALS. It is a 
modified version of the introductory essay to Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Dispute Processing and 
Conflict Resolution: Theory, Practice and Policy (Burlington, 2003). 
Journal of Legal Education, Volume 54, Number 1 (March 2004) 
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problem solving. This is the "creativity" in human conflict resolution that I 
believe is necessary for our future survival. Third, developments in the parallel 
fields of legal dispute resolution and the more multidisciplinary conflict 
resolution provide us with a special opportunity to explore the correspon-
dences, contrasts, and learning from domestic disputes and international 
conflicts, as we test whether particular concepts, approaches, and processes 
can be generalized or have only contextual validity. Finally, my work in the 
field of dispute and conflict resolution has always been a movement back and 
forth from theory development to practice, seeking what Donald Schon has 
called "theory-in-use"l and what I have called "ethical practice"-practice that 
is informed by theory and by morally legitimate uses. Disputes and conflicts 
are human constructs. We need theory to understand their causes, dynamics, 
and trajectories of actions and reactions, but ultimately we need practice to 
use conflict creatively and constructively, to make 'Justice" in legal terms and 
to make "peace" in human terms. 
If recent world events have taught us anything, it is that conflict and 
conflicting notions of the good are inevitable for human beings. So, while 
many of us seek ways to establish more universal notions of the good toward 
which to direct our human efforts, it has, sadly, become, in the early years of 
the twenty-first century, more common for us to assume there will be basic 
value differences among us. We should, then, spend our time thinking about 
how we can at least develop fair and considerate processes for communicating 
enough with each other so that we may act with the most benefit and the least 
harm. Some offer hopes that "the rule of law" can be universalized as a 
principled way to resolve conflicts, domestically and internationally. Others of 
us see law as often conflictual, indeterminate, and politically contested or 
manipulable, or so focused on the need for regulation of the aggregate that 
it cannot always do 'Justice" in particular cases. Legal justice is not always 
actual justice. 
The social philosopher Stuart Hampshire has recently concluded, in his 
book Justice Is Conflict, that while we may never agree about what the content of 
universal justice is "because there never will be such a harmony, either in the 
soul or in the city," we might instead come closer to recognizing that "fairness 
in procedures for resolving conflicts is the fundamental kind of fairness, and 
that it is acknowledged as a value in most cultures, places, and times: fairness 
in procedure is an invariable value, a constant in human nature. "2 Hampshire 
goes on to say-in words eloquent enough to make one feel proud of what has 
constituted at least half of a lifetime's work of theorizing and practice 10 
conflict resolution-that 
[b]ecause there will always be conflicts between conceptions of the good, 
moral conflicts, both in the soul and in the city, there is everywhere a well-
1. See Donald A. Schon, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action (New 
York, 1983); Donald A. Schon & Martin Rein, Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of 
Intractable Policy Controversies (New York, 1994). 
2. Stuart Hampshire,Justice Is Conflict 4 (Princeton, 2000). 
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recognized need for procedures of conflict resolution, which can replace 
brute force and domination and tyranny.3 
The existence of such an institution [for conflict resolution], and the particular 
form of its rules and conventions of procedure are matters of historical 
contingency. There is no rational necessity about the more specific rules and 
conventions determining the criteria for success in argument in any particular 
institution, except the overriding necessity that each side in the conflict 
should be heard putting its case ("audi alteram par/em '].4 
[T]he skillful management of conflicts [is] among the highest of human 
skills.5 
9 
Hampshire identifies several principles which are crucial to understanding 
the importance of procedural justice. 
1. Conflict is human and ubiquitous. Conflict is actually necessary for 
defining what is important about oneself and the polity to which individuals 
belong, and for instigating important social change (e.g., the elimination of 
slavery, the movements toward racial and gender equality, as well as increased 
democratic participation in many nations). Agreement on all human values is 
unlikely given human diversity, deep-seated cultural norms, and the variation 
of human needs and desires. 
2. Even if we cannot all agree on substantive norms and goals, we can 
probably agree on some processes for making decisions that will enable us to 
go forward and act. We might have some virtually universal ideas about 
procedural fairness, like the ability to "make a case" and "be heard" and to 
have impartiality and fairness govern any decision-making process. Some 
might go further and suggest that some participation in the process by which 
decisions are made is essential to the legitimacy of a process (with or without 
commitments to democratic political regimes). 
3. There is historical (and I would add functional) variation to what those 
fair procedures might be in any particular context, as long as all (not just 
"both") parties are given an opportunity to be heard on (or, I would add, 
participate in) decisions affecting them. This is the principle of process plural-
ism (which is of defining importance to the modern dispute resolution move-
ment and is what distinguishes us, conflict theorists and practitioners, from 
more conventional jurisprudes who often still see conventional legal processes 
as the only way forward to substantive justice). 
4. Conflict resolution is a human skill (to be theorized about, taught, 
learned, and practiced) and a difficult but highly valued one at that. I would 
add it is more than a single skill, constituting a multidimensional set of skills, 
implicating abilities to listen, articulate, advocate, empathize, analyze, facili-
tate, create, manage, and care about people and their problems, issues, values, 
and material well-being. 
3. Id. at 5. 
4. Id. at 18. 
5. Id. at 35. 
HeinOnline -- 54 J. Legal Educ. 10 2004
10 Journal of Legal Education 
Process Pluralism 
Yet, if procedural justice is important to modern justice seekers, it is also 
important to recognize that particular processes do affect outcomes. This is 
what drew me away from focusing on limited legal remedies to thinking more 
broadly about substantive problem solving and conflict resolution in deeper 
and richer sociological and psychological contexts.6 While process pluralism 
allows us to choose different processes for functional or other reasons, we 
must also consider that the choice of a particular process will almost certainly 
affect the outcome we produce. This is the basic principle of my own work in 
negotiation: to choose an adversarial process, whether litigative or negotiable, 
is to limit the field of possible outcomes to distributive arrangements (binary 
or zero or negative sum solutions, stalemates, or unprincipled compromises). 
To choose another process may allow for more creative, joint-gain, wealth-
creating, and satisfactory possibilities to emerge.7 Thus, process pluralism has 
both a darker and a lighter side. While more choices of process might appear 
to improve substantive outcomes, especially with more party participation, 
each process produces its own morality (an insight we owe to legal philoso-
pher and practitioner Lon FullerS) and structures its own solutions and 
outcomes. Critics suggest that coercive pushes toward participatory processes 
seeking consensus and false "harmony" may be just as unjust as the harder-
edged and more hierarchical conventional institutions.9 
With increasing sensitivity to the notion that different processes produce 
different outcomes, modern analysts are now looking at how particular con-
flict and dispute resolution or democratic processes (rational-principled vs. 
preference trading-bargaining, open vs. closed, plenary vs. committee) pro-
duce different results, even in such value-laden deliberations as constitution 
makinglO and in such complex settings as private and governmental organiza-
tions, as well as in both private and public international settings. 
For me, a focus on how we deal with human conflicts in a wide range of 
contexts (from the individual to the dyadic; group, organizational, social, and 
relational; commercial as well as political; local, domestic, and international) 
raises issues of inevitable tensions among and between the very values about 
which we have conflicts. Can peace be achieved without justice? Can justice be 
achieved without peace? Is law a proper measure of justice? If not law, what is? 
6. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search of a Theory, 
1983 Am. B. Found. Res.]. 905. 
7. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of 
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 754 (1984). 
8. For the full collection of Fuller's essays on legal process variations and the internal and 
separate "integrity" of each process, see Lon L. Fuller, The Principles of Social Order: 
Selected Essays of Lon L. Fuller, rev. ed., ed. Kenneth I. Winston (Oxford, 2001) (1981). 
9. See, e.g., Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacifica-
tion in the Movement to Re-form Dispute Ideology, 9 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 1 (1993). 
10. See Jack Rakove, The Great Compromise: Ideas, Interests and the Politics of Constitution 
Making, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 424 (1987); Jon Elster, Strategic Uses of Argument, in 
Barriers to Conflict Resolution, eds. Kenneth]. Arrow et al. (New York, 1995); Dana Lansky, 
Proceeding to a Constitution: A Multi-Party Negotiation Analysis of the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787,5 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 279 (2000). 
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How much should individual or group parties be able to craft their own 
arrangements or agreements to proceed with social, economic, and political 
life without consideration of the effects of their arrangements on others? Must 
all dispute or conflict resolution be accountable to those outside of the 
dispute itself? When is a "dispute" between two parties really a "polycentric" 
conflict, affecting others, or implicating more enmeshed social values? If 
there is process pluralism, how are we to judge if the "proper" process has 
been chosen for the particular matter at hand? These are some of the ques-
tions to be explored. 
Like Stuart Hampshire, I believe in procedural justice as justice because we 
need ways to talk to and struggle with each other about how to move forward 
when we disagree. Unlike Stuart Hampshire, I do not adopt the streamlined 
and universalized definition he gives of procedural justice as reducing to "the 
adversary principle" of (merely) '~hearing the other side." Much of my work 
has been devoted to demonstrating that most disputes and conflicts do not 
have only two sides, either of parties or "players" (plaintiffs and defendants) or 
"issues" or arguments (win/lose, yes/no). In our postmodern and fractured 
world, many disputes and conflicts are, in fact, characterized by complicated 
issues (e.g., resource allocation), multiple-party responsibility (are we past 
single fault attributions and simplistic causal assumptions in law yet, or do we 
lag so far behind science?), and generational and other "third-party" impacts 
(for example, in environmental and family dissolution matters). In my view, 
we need both new multiparty processes (beyond the outmoded two-sided 
adversary system!!) and new substantively creative solutions!2 (beyond the 
"limited remedial imagination of courts [and other legal institutions] "!3) to 
find justice in our increasingly diverse postmodern world. 
In this essay I outline the challenges, cleavages, and consensuses that have 
emerged as the field of dispute processing or conflict resolution has at-
tempted to create, define, and implement institutions and processes of proce-
dural justice. Throughout, a few important themes recur, with implications 
for how dispute resolution should be taught. 
Of Disputes and Conflicts and Dispute Processing and Conflict Resolution 
The field is now variously referred to as dispute resolution, alternative 
dispute resolution (assuming all processes other than adjudication are alterna-
tive), or appropriate dispute resolution (assuming functional fits of "forums to 
fusses"!4). More broadly, conflict resolution demonstrates, in its multifarious 
nomenclature, its rather promiscuous or multiple-heritage ancestry. Many 
different intellectual disciplines have contributed basic concepts, research 
11. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, 
Multicultural World, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 5 (1996). 
12. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable 
in Legal Education? 6 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 97 (2001). 
13. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 791. 
14. Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly 
Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 Negot.J. 49 (1994). 
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agendas, institutional forms, and professional roles, enactments, and practices. 
For purposes of some (perhaps artificial) clarity, I suggest here, as I review the 
history of the development of the field and its key ideas and concepts, that 
"disputes" and "dispute resolution" have been constituted by the legal field, 
and "conflicts" and "conflict resolution" by the broader pastiche of the social 
sciences (anthropology, political science, international relations, sociology, 
psychology, history, economics, and game theory) and their more 
multidisciplinary social activist spinoffs, such as peace studies,15 social move-
ment theory and practice, 16 and conflict resolution. 17 While "disputes" may be 
about legal cases, conflicts are more broadly and deeply about human relations 
and transactions. Conflict "handling" may be both more and less involving and 
complicated than "dispute settlement" or "conflict management." 
The study of "dispute processing" is a sort of bridge terminology and field, 
having been constituted by legal anthropologists (some of whom were and are 
lawyers) to move the focus away from legally constructed "cases" to the 
broader notion of culturally and contextually embedded "disputes" having 
existences, before, during, and after formal legal disputes. IS This rich line of 
both theorizing and empirical study of dispute processing in the tradition of 
sociolegal studies l9 has sought to study disputants, their representatives, the 
context and content of their disputes, and the varieties of processes chosen to 
"process" (not necessarily to resolve or manage) their disputes, in order to 
uncover what social processes and relationships, in addition to, or other than, 
"law," influence what actually happens to disputes. 
The sociolegal focus on "disputing processes" de-centers-but does not 
eliminate-law as the primary variable explaining how disputes are resolved. 
It was a natural derivative of the school oflegal realism, which in its own time 
de-centered doctrine in legal studies and, indeed, provided the first genera-
tion of dispute resolution scholars and practitioners-among them Lon 
Fuller, Soia Mentschikoff, and Karl Llewellyn-who studied legal institutions 
where doctrine was made, enforced, and sometimes resisted or transformed 
in practice.20 
15. John Paul Lederach, Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures (Syra-
cuse, 1995). 
16. Peter Ackerman & Jack Duvall, A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict 
(New York, 2000). 
17. Oliver Ramsbotham et al., Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management 
and Transformation of Deadly Conflict (Cambridge, 1999); Louis Kriesberg, Constructive 
Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution (Lanham, 1998). 
18. Karl Llewellyn & E. Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in 
Primitive Jurisprudence (Norman, 1941); Richard Abel, A Comparative Theory of Dispute 
Institutions in Society, 8 Law & Soc'y Rev. 217 (1973); William L. F. Felstiner, Influences of 
Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 63 (1974); William L. F. 
Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claim-
ing ... ,15 Law & Soc'y Rev. 631 (1980-81); The Disputing Process: Law in Ten Societies, eds. 
Laura Nader & Harry F. ToddJr. (New York, 1978). 
19. See 15 Law & Soc'y Rev. 391 (1980-81) (special issue on dispute processing and civil 
litigation) . 
20. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers ofInvention: The Intellectual Founders of 
ADR, 16 Ohio St.]. on Disp. Resol. 1 (2000). 
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The study of conflict and conflict resolution dearly predates the focus on 
disputes and dispute resolution institutions in the law. Sociologists such as 
Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, Georg Simmel,21 and Lewis A. Coser22 were 
interested in both the structure and function of various forms of conflict in 
society. It was sociologists who first argued 'for the constructive role of conflict 
and the positive social change dimensions of conflict in society. 
Social psychologists took up the study of conflict, in both its "destructive" 
and "constructive" forms,23 as they focused on both individual and group 
behaviors in preventing, making, escalating, resolving, and reconciling con-
flict. 24 A different group of social psychologists studied and created a new 
field, "procedural justice," which empirically examined differences with re-
spect to expectations and performances in different process settings (contrast-
ing, for example, adversarial structures with inquisitorial ones,25 and media-
tion and arbitration forms with adjudication). These social scientists have 
documented that participants in dispute resolution processes have a strong 
desire for "procedural fairness" that may be more robust than their satisfac-
tion or concerns about actual outcomes.26 
Social psychologists have more recently focused on how human cognitive 
errors both produce conflict and prevent us from resolving conflicts in ratio-
nal and efficient ways, identifYing a group of heuristic and strategic errors we 
make in processing information and forming preferences when we interact 
with others.27 
Sociologists and social psychologists together have produced a variety of 
typologies and taxonomies of types of conflicts, specifYing such variations as 
material vs. nonmaterial (value- or needs-based) conflicts; perceptual, behav-
ioral, and attitudinal conflicts; malleability or changeability of the res in 
conflict; numbers of parties in conflict (dyadic vs. multiparty); intergroup 
21. Conflict and the Web ofIntergroup Affiliations (New York, 1955). 
22. The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, 1956), 
23. Morton Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes (New 
Haven, 1973); Kurt Lewin, Resolving Social Conflicts (New York, 1948), 
24, Dean G. Pruitt & Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement (New 
York,1986). 
25. E, Allen Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (New York, 1988); 
John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis (Hillsdale, 
1975) . 
26. E. Allen Lind et aI., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their 
Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 Law & Soc'y Rev. 953 (1990). 
27. See Barriers to Conflict Resolution, supra note lO;James Reason, Human Error (Cambridge, 
1990); Richard Nisbett & Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social 
Judgment (Englewood Cliffs, 1980); Lee Ross & Richard E. Nisbett, The Person and the 
Situation: Perspectives of Social Psychology (Philadelphia, 1991); Judgment Under Uncer-
tainty: Heruristics and Biases, eds. Daniel Kahneman et al. (Cambridge, 1982); Max H. 
Bazerman & MargaretA. Neale, Negotiating Rationally (New York, 1992); Max H. Bazerman, 
Judgment in Managerial Decision Making, 5th ed. (New York, 2002). 
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(e.g., nation-state) vs. intragroup (organizational) conflicts; and intrapersonal 
vs. interpersonal conflicts. Efforts at cataloging types of conflicts, replicated in 
political science for both domestic and international disputes and conflicts, 
and now law, are based on the rationalistic hopes that taxonomies of charac-
teristics will enable us to collect data, identify patterns or "indicators," and 
make predictions for the trajectory of a conflict and perhaps for its "treat-
ment" in various forms of prescriptive conflict resolution interventions. 
Cultural variations in how conflicts are defined, experienced, and acted on 
have engaged anthropologists since at least the nineteenth century.28 Now the 
old debates about cultural differences have reared their heads again in claims 
of "clashes of civilizations," both in the definitions of and the "processing" 
(including interpretation or "meaning making") of conflicts, at nation-state, 
cultural, ethnic, religious, group, and individuallevels.29 Some of our Ameri-
canized-"newer"-forms of dispute resolution are derived from older forms 
in other cultures and, some would say, lose something in the translation, 
derived from Mrican moots30 or Asian mediation3! even as they try both to 
adopt new cultural forms and "mediate" cultural diversity within one nation 
and its internal disputes.32 
International relations theorists, who were among the first to formally study 
negotiation processes (along with game theorists and mathematicians, devel-
oping models for strategic interactions in war and Cold War settings), have 
reemerged as organizers of both theoretical and empirical propositions to test 
in modern international crisis33 (see, e.g., the role of deadline and "ripeness" 
in dispute settlement34). Roger Fisher, key developer of the "principled nego-
tiation" model of integrative negotiation in Getting to Yes,35 although a law 
professor at the time, developed many of his insights from international and 
diplomatic service in the U.S. State Department.36 
28. Kevin Avruch, Type I and Type II Errors in Culturally Sensitive Conflict Resolution Practice, 
20 Conflict Resol. Q.351 (2003); Kevin Avruch, Culture and Conflict Resolution (Washing-
ton, 1998). 
29. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New 
York, 1996). 
30. P. H. Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations: A Cross-Cultural Perspective (New York, 1979). 
31. Stanley B. Lubman, Dispute Resolution in China After Deng Xiaoping: "Mao and Mediation" 
Re\~sited, 11 Colum. J. Asian L. 229 (1997). 
32. The Conflict and Culture Reader, ed. Pat K Chew (New York, 2001). 
33. Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, eds. Chester A. Crocker et aI. 
(Washington, 1999) [hereinafter Herding Cats]; Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Man-
aging International Conflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker et aI. (Washington, 2001) [hereinafter 
Turbulent Peace]. 
34. I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York, 
1985); Robert Malley & Hussein Agha, Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors, N.Y. Rev. Books, 
Aug. 9, 2001, at 59; George]. Mitchell, Making Peace (New York, 1999). 
35. Roger Fisher et aI., Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, 2d ed. (Boston, 
1991). 
36. Roger Fisher, International Conflict for Beginners (New York, J 969). 
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Looking at choices about how to behave in conflict situations, theorists 
(from game theory, mathematics, economics, and political science)37 have 
inspired both laboratory and empirical studies of strategic behavior and 
interaction, focusing on how participants in a conflict or dispute situation 
respond to their own inner needs and interests, those of clients or principals 
(in representative settings38), and to the "others" (adversaries or partners) in 
settings where more than one person is needed to coordinate action or 
respond to a conflict. Some of the earliest and best work in conflict theory has 
been derived from organizational management,39 labor relations,4o and the 
applied sciences of decision making41 and problem solving.42 
A new turn in political theory and practice, with implications (see below) 
for legal dispute resolution, has focused on processes that foster democratic 
discourse and enhance opportunities for participation in decisions that affect 
the polity. Informed by the moral and social philosophy of J urgen Habermas 
seeking "ideal speech conditions,"43 this new theory attempts to describe 
alternative processes to maximize citizen participation in policymaking and 
resolution of contested disputes where inevitable value differences occur with 
increasingly diverse populations. Political theorists44 and policy activists45 have 
37. E.g., John von Neuman & Oscar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior 
(Princeton, 1944); Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass., 1960); 
R. Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey 
(New York, 1957); John F. Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18 Econometrica 155 (1950); 
John F. Nash, Two-Person Cooperative Games, 21 Econometrica 128 (1953); Robert Axelrod, 
The Evolution of Cooperation (New York, 1984); Steven J. Brams & Alan D. Taylor, Fair 
Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution (Cambridge, 1996). 
38. Negotiating on Behalf of Others: Advice to Lawyers, Business Executives, Sports Agents, 
Diplomats, Politicians, and Everybody Else, eds. Robert H. Mnookin & Lawrence E. Susskind 
(Thousand Oaks, 1999); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lawyer Negotiations: Theories and Reali-
ties-What We Learn from Mediation, 56 Mod. L. Rev. 361 (1993). 
39. Mary Parker Follett, Constructive Conflict, in Mary Parker Follett: Prophet of Management: A 
Celebration of Writings from the 1920's, ed. Pauline Graham (Boston, 1996); Robert Rogers 
Blake, Managing Intergroup Conflict in Industry (Houston, 1964); K Thomas, Conflict and 
Conflict Management, in Handbook of Industrial Organizational Psychology, ed. M. D. 
Dunnette 889 (Chicago, 1976). 
40. Richard E. Walton & Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: An 
Analysis ofa Social Interaction System (New York, 1965). 
41. John S. Hammond et aI., Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions 
(Boston, 1999); Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (Cambridge, 
1999); Richard J. Zeckhauser et aI., Wise Choices: Decisions, Games, and Negotiations 
(Boston, 1996). 
42. James L. Adams, Conceptual Blockbusting: A Guide to Better Ideas (Reading, 1974). 
43. Jiirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 
and Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass., 1996);Jiirgen Habermas, Discourse 
Ethics, trans. Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen, in Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative Action (Cambridge, 1990) ;Jiirgen Habermas, 1 & 2 The Theory ofCommu-
nicative Action (Boston, 1984). 
44. Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven, 1998); Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, 
Democracyand Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass., 1996);Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Adversarial 
Democracy (New York, 1980); James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, 
and Democracy (Cambridge, Mass., 1996); James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: 
New Directions for Democratic Reform (New Haven, 1991). 
45. Carmen Sirianni & Lewis Friedland, Civic Innovation in America: Community Empower-
ment, Public Policy, and the Movement for Civic Renewal (Berkeley, 2001); Lawrence 
Susskind & Liora Zion, Can America's Democracy Be Improved? (N.D.) 
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suggested new ways for developing alternative processes to our formally 
constitutionalized governmental institutions of executive, legislative, and judi-
cial power: ad hoc policymaking groups,46 negotiated rule making,47 regional-
ized or substantively organized decision making,48 and "public conversations" 
that seek to enhance human understanding, if not effectuate particular out-
comes or agreements49-all based on different notions of "negotiated" agree-
ments of the polity. 
To the extent that the new multidisciplinary field of conflict resolution50 
has been born out of these different disciplines, there is an interesting mix of 
individual, organizational, theoretical, empirical, and professional levels of 
theory, practice, and policy. Conflict resolution theory, research, and practice 
now focus on the development of professionals in negotiation, mediation, 
facilitation, consensus building, and other conflict resolution skills; the em-
pirical study of particular kinds of conflicts (domestic, as well as interna-
tional); and the institutional design and evaluation of particular approaches 
to structuring conflict resolution or management. 
Legal Processes, Legal Institutions, and the Law in Conflict Resolution 
It was precisely because the legal field's focus on "legal disputes" or cases 
was so narrow and explained so little that I first began to think and write about 
legal disputes and the search for justice in a broader disciplinary framework.5l 
As a practicing lawyer for the poor and then as a legal clinician teaching law 
students how to be lawyers, I was struck by the insufficiency of legal remedies 
at solving clients' underlying problems and addressing underlying needs.52 
Legal disputes were a much narrower subset of actual human, social, political, 
and economic conflicts. 
In order to understand how legal disputes might better be resolved, I 
turned to a number of different disciplines (sociology, political science, 
psychology, economics, mathematics, game theory, international relations, 
and the newer peace studies and conflict resolution) for theoretical frame-
works to help me understand how human problems were resolved in realms 
outside oflaw. My essay "Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search of 
a Theory" -was a review of this literature, both scholarly and popular, to 
46. The Consensus Building Handbook: A Comprehensive Guide to Reaching Agreement, eds. 
Lawrence Susskind et al. (Thousand Oaks, 1999) [hereinafter Consensus Building Hand-
book]. 
47. Philip]. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 Geo. LJ. 1 (1982);Jody 
Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1997). 
48. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 
Colum. L. Rev. 267 (1998); Judith S. Kaye, Changing Courts in Changing Times: The Need 
for a Fresh Look at How Courts Are Run, 48 Hastings LJ .. 851 (1997); Greg Berman &John 
Feinblatt, Problem Solving Courts: A Primer, 23 Law & Pol'y Q. 125 (2001). 
49. Michelle LeBaron & Nike Carstarphen, Finding Common Ground on Abortion, in Consen-
sus Building Handbook, supra note 46. 
50. Kriesberg, supra note 17; The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, eds. 
Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman (San Francisco, 2000). 
51. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6. 
52. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7. 
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demonstrate that other fields had gone much further than law,jurisprudence, 
and even the newer clinical study of law to develop models and frameworks 
for studying negotiation processes for human dispute resolution and prob-
lem solving. 53 
The strategic work of game theorists to understand interactions of, first, 
two parties, and then, more than two parties, in situations of perfect, mixed, or 
no information seemed to have great resonance for legal disputes, which, 
culturally at least, are most often conceived of as competitive, distributive 
games of allocation of limited resources (mostly money in lawsuits, but also 
stock, land, and even children in child custody cases, and other "tangibles" 
that might not be divisible at all). Strategic moves to maximize money or 
tangibles, on behalf of a client, seemed the lawyer's most common default 
behavior, based on assumptions of resource scarcity and goals of client maxi-
mization. If the law's purpose was to declare right and wrong, then disputes 
resolved in legal institutions, like courts or legislatures, were likely to have 
binary outcomes (or compromises-typically split-the-difference compro-
mises-based on binary claims). The job of the conventional adversarial 
lawyer, like the payoff-maximizing game player, was to gather as much of the 
goods or goodies for the client as possible. Advocacy in court was seen as 
directly transferable to adversarial persuasion techniques in negotiation, where 
only the audience differed.54 
From a broader perspective, much of this emphasis on competitive strate-
gies in negotiation mirrored strategic, if deterrent, approaches to larger 
political conflicts in the Cold War era. Many social commentators have sug-
gested that although law may be the leading "adversarial" institution, much in 
Anglo-American culture is based on adversary argument, from the media to 
politics to education to gender relations. 55 Social psychologists, labor negotia-
tors, organizational development specialists, and anthropologists, however, 
focused on a broader catalog of human behavior, suggesting, at the very least, 
that there was a greater variety of human approaches to negotiated problems, 
differentiating integrative possibilities (substantive "trades" of differentially 
valued items) with use of different human interactional processes (coopera-
tion, collaboration, and adaptation56). 
I studied this multidisciplinary literature for insights into two aspects of 
dispute and conflict resolution in law that remain present in my work today: 
(1) dispute resolution involves both process and substance, and (2) these ele-
ments of any human problem interact and are constitutive of each other. 
Thus, to the extent that one considers the res of a problem to be an indivisible 
tangible item or an uncompromisable principle or belief, then competition is 
53. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6. 
54. See, e.g., Herb Cohen, You Can Negotiate Anything: The World's Best Negotiator Tells You 
How to Get What You Want (Secaucus, 1980). 
55. Deborah Tannen, The Argument Culture: Moving from Debate to Dialogue (New York, 
1998) . 
56. P. Terrence Hopmann, Bargaining and Problem Solving: Two Perspectives on International 
Negotiation, in Turbulent Peace, supra note 33. 
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likely to be the process chosen. In turn, this choice of process (adversarialism 
or competition) will affect (and limit) the possible outcomes to binary, com-
promised, or stalemated or impasse solutions.57 Different orientations, mindsets, 
frameworks, approaches, or assumptions (after analysis about the res, the 
number of parties, etc.) about what the matter is about58 should cause the 
skilled negotiator to choose appropriate processes (to be enacted in the artful 
practice or behavioral aspects of conflict resolution) for the kind of matter 
at hand. 
In short, as I have now written many times (and taught thousands of 
students over the years), conflict resolution involves both cognitive (the "sci-
ence" or analysis of any conflict or dispute) and behavioral (the "art" and 
practice of conflict resolution and problem solving) components. We must 
learn to analyze and understand what conflicts and disputes are about, in their 
full contextual complexity,59 before we can choose the appropriate behavioral 
response. Once we have decided on our goals and desired outcomes, we can 
seek to achieve them with a broader repertoire of processes and behaviors 
(whether goals are defined as maximizing individual or joint gain, or seeking 
Pareto-optimal or 'Just" solutions). That broader repertoire of behaviors 
(communication skills, creative problem solving, questioning, as well as per-
suading, listening, synthesizing, as well as analyzing) can and must be taught. 5O 
Legal problem solving is not just about adversarial argument or persuasion 
about what is "right" for the client; it is about understanding a range of 
possible goals for clients and those with whom they interact, and seeking both 
substantive outcomes and appropriate processes to satisfy the needs and 
interests of clients and those engaged in activity with the client. 
But mere analysis of the status quo was not all that I had in mind. In one of 
those wonderful moments of intellectual convergence (more pretentiously 
described as a "paradigm shift" in the sociology of science61 ), many critics of 
the legal system were focused not only on the increasing costs and delays of 
the litigation system62 (what I have labeled the "quantitative" approach to legal 
conflict resolution), but on the quality of the solutions or resolutions pro-
duced by court orders or settlements negotiated in their "shadow."63 At about 
57. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 760. 
58. On the "science" of negotiation, see Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation: 
How to Resolve Conflicts and Get the Best Out of Bargaining (Cambridge, Mass., 1982); 
Howard Raiffa with John Richardson & David Metcalfe, Negotiation Analysis: The Science 
and Art of Collective Decision-Making (Cambridge, Mass., 2002). 
59. Including a variety of contextual factors specified in Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 927-
28. 
60. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, supra note 12; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Problem Solving 
Pedagogy Seriously, 49 J. Legal Educ. 14 (1999); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap 
by Narrowing the Field: "''hat's Missing from the MacCrate Repon-Of Skills, Legal Science 
and Being a Human Being, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 593 (1994); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, To Solve 
Problems, Not Make Them: Integrating ADR in the Law School Curriculum, 46 SMU L. Rev. 
801 (1993). 
61. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, 1970). 
62. Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 77 F.R.D. III (1976). 
63. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of 
Divorce, 88 Yale L. Rev. 950 (1979). 
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the same time that I sought to reorient lawyers to a "problem-solving" ap-
proach to negotiation,r>4 Roger Fisher and the newly created Program on 
Negotiation at Harvard University focused on "principled negotiation"65 to 
develop models for negotiators to successfully pursue joint gain and agree-
ments that are wise and efficient and improve-rather than destroy-relation-
ships by looking for different kinds of "solutions" to legal, social, political, and 
economic problems. I called it "creative problem-solving," but in more techni-
cal disciplinary terms this work asked lawyer-negotiators who had cultural 
default assumptions about scarce resources and competitive behaviors to 
think instead in terms of integrative solutions and wealth-creating rather than 
wealth-destroying solutions (the negative-sum games of litigation and sunk 
transaction costs). 
In trying to reorient lawyers to a different set of assumptions about legal 
problems, expanding and enhancing their substantive problem-solving skills, 
I found that while others had gone before me, both inside and outside law, 
lawyers seemed to need to be reminded of this important work. At the level of 
searching for creative ways to manage conflict, to seek integrative solutions, 
and to create pie-expanding rather than pie-diminishing solutions (I use 
many food metaphors in my work!), the early work of administrative scientist 
Mary Parker Follett and related work in labor-management relations66 were 
key. Foundationally significant were social psychologists Abraham Maslow6i 
and George Homans,68 whose important work suggested that basic human 
needs must be met for human flourishing and may be complementary for 
different human beings, rather than always conflicting, for satisfactory human 
interaction and problem solving. 
At the level of process, the legal realists-Lon Fuller, Soia Mentschikoff, 
and Karl Llewellyn, among others-suggested that different legal processes 
and institutions (adjudication, arbitration, mediation, and "common business 
practices" or social norms) served different functions and produced different 
kinds of outcomes (often with their own jurisprudential justifications, integ-
rity, or "morality"). I trace these and other earlier "roots" of modern legal 
dispute resolution theory in "The Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The 
Intellectual Founders of ADR. "69 My aspiration has been to continue this work 
to add other processes to the mix (negotiation, facilitation, consensus build-
ing, and other multiparty processes) to analyze, understand, and implement 
both process values (more participation and legitimacy of result) and substan-
tive justice values (better "quality" and more tailored and creative solutions to 
legal problems). 
64. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7. 
65. Fisher et aI., supra note 35; Raiffa, supra note 58; David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, The 
Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Competitive Gain (New York, 
1986). 
66. Walton & McKersie, supra note 40. 
67. Abraham Harold Maslow, The Farther Reaches of Human Nature (New York, 1971). 
68. George Caspar Homans, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms (New York, 1961). 
69. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 20. 
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Viewing negotiation as one of the foundational blocks (in both theory and 
practice) of good dispute resolution, I have focused on some counter-legal! 
cultural notions. While compromise or a split-the-difference solution between 
two high and opposite offers or demands is a common approach to traditional 
legal negotiations (and, sadly, serves as the model for what is called Lloyds of 
London settlement brokerage by judges in judicial settlement conferences70), 
compromise is often an unprincipled result in legal negotiations where par-
ties or lawyers fail to explore the full panoply of their various needs and 
interests, including legal, economic, social, psychological, emotional, moral, 
political, and religious. 71 
Although Fisher, Vry, and Patton's template focuses on going behind 
"positions" to look for parties' real "interests," which can often be met by 
"efficient trades" of compatible, but not conflicting, interests (e.g., different 
valuations of time, money, things, tax leveraging), I have urged a focus on 
"needs" (in my case, from a feminist focus on human needs, but compatible 
with John Burton's focus on human needs in the international dispute con-
texr72). As "needs" may stand behind or "under" even interests (often self-
proclaimed and still assumed to be mostly economistically instrumental), the 
lawyer can probe for (in interviews and other interactions with the client13 ) 
longer-term needs beyond the short-term, case-based "interests." The lawyer 
may help uncover the needs of the client and other affected third parties. This 
broader, social welfare (if perhaps somewhat maternalistic) approach to de-
termining what actually may be at issue in a dispute is consistent with the 
approach of many mediators and conflict resolvers to go beyond the "framed" 
dispute to look at what the underlying conflict is really about and "reframe" it. 
With a deeper and perhaps longer list of "needs," efficient trades continue 
(perhaps there are more or fewer of them), but parties and their lawyers can 
attempt to negotiate for deeper and ultimately more stable satisfaction among 
the parties. Here, "compromise" is often only a last resort, after principles and 
satisfaction or "trades" of needs are fully pursued or, in the language of 
conventional bargainers, "exploited." 
As I have argued elsewhere,74 compromise need not be seen as anathema to 
jurisprudes who view principle and law as the sole measure of justice. John 
Coons argued quite eloquently, long before the current work in legal dispute 
resolution, that some legal matters are not capable of binary solutions (e.g., 
child custody, now institutionalized in joint legal custody; comparative fault, 
now institutionalized in comparative negligence regimes; and mixed ques-
tions oflaw and fact with mixed legal responsibility or factual uncertainty, the 
70. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory 
Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 485 (1985). 
71. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7. 
72. See Conflict: Human Needs Theory, ed.John Wear Burton (London, 1990). 
73. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Transformation of Disputes by Lawyers: What the Dispute 
Paradigm Does and Does Not Tell Us, 2 Mo.]. Disp. Resol. 25 (1985). 
74. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophical and Democratic 
Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 Geo. LJ. 2663 (1995). 
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jury compromise), and so in some cases compromises or negotiated resolu-
tions are actually more 'just" than more extreme binary solutions, precisely 
because of their distributed "precision. "75 I have argued a somewhat related 
point that while legal principles (especially statutory law, passed by legislatures 
for the "average," "aggregate," or "typical" situation) may serve as "general" 
justice, in particular cases justice may better be served by tailored "departures" 
from the general rule (as long as the negotiated solutions are not otherwise 
unlawful) .76 Negotiated justice may, then, for the individuals involved, be 
more 'just" than legislated or court-ruled justice. 
To the extent that negotiation and mediation, with their assumptions of 
compromised results, have often appeared distasteful to principled and pure 
jurisprudes, more recent extensions of some of Lon Fuller's work have use-
fully explored the internal (and external) integrity of both such processes and 
such outcomes. Where issues or items are multifaceted or value is embedded 
or connected in a web of other issues or parties (as in Fuller's classic division 
of an art collection77), trades, tailor-made solutions, or contingent agree-
ments, linking past to future in dynamic and changeable solutions, are often 
preferable to rigid, past-focused adjudication of "rights and responsibilities" 
from rigid legal principles. At the macrosocietal level, even the much dero-
gated Machiavelli has much to teach us about the value of compromise.78 To 
hold the polity together, the prince or leader (or lawyer) may not be too 
"virtuous" (or principled) himself; it is his job to hold together a widely 
divergent population with outcomes or solutions that are satisfactory to most 
of the people most of the time, and he must, above all, be flexible. The 
politician, who must work with others with different values from his, like the 
lawyer, must consider long-term goals, future "deals," and the peace and 
harmony of the larger community. To compromise is often to apprehend and 
recognize the reality of the needs of the "other. "79 
Thus, in modern negotiation theory, consideration of "the other" is as 
important as consideration of gain for one's principal. "Getting to Yes" means 
creating conditions so that the "other" will want to do what you ask of him, by 
providing him with enough gain or needs satisfaction to render an agreement 
better than the condition of no agreement at all. In negotiation parlance, the 
negotiated agreement must be better than the BATNA (the Best Alternative 
To a Negotiated Agreement). Focus on achieving joint gain, then, inspires the 
good negotiator to be creative and look for substantive solutions that are 
satisfactory or welfare enhancing for all parties. This is why working on 
mutually agreed-to (truly consented-to) solutions seems so much more appeal-
ing to me than the coerced or commanded outcomes of formal legal institu-
75. John Coons, Compromise as Precise Justice, in NOMOS XXI Compromise in Ethics, Law, 
and Politics, eds. J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman, (New York, 1979) [hereinafter 
NOMOS XXI Compromise] ;John Coons, Approaches to Court-Imposed Compromise-The 
Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. L. Rev. 750 (1964). 
76. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 74. 
77. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 394 (1978). 
78. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. George Bull, 90-92,101 (Baltimore, (1961). 
79. Martin Golding, The Nature of Compromise, in NOMOS XXI Compromise, supra note 75. 
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tions, which, even when ordering 'Just results," are so often resisted by hos-
tilely defeated parties. (Though I would never argue that Brown v. Board of 
Education was not a necessary court' decision that enunciated an important 
social and constitutional norm of nondiscrimination, its failure to be immedi-
ately complied with is a product of resistance (and, sadly, popular will) to a 
commanded court order.) 
Much of negotiation and other nonadjudicative forms of legal dispute 
resolution, thus, are justified on philosophical and political grounds of con-
sent. The claim made on behalf of such nonadjudicative forms of dispute 
resolution is that when commands from government-sponsored institutions, 
like courts, are not required, decisions reached by the parties themselves or 
facilitated by "wise elders" (as in many forms of mediation) 80 will have greater 
legitimacy and longevity as the product of the parties' own agreements, rather 
than commanded from on high. 
This key underlying value of "consent" is itself contested, as many commen-
tators have suggested that negotiation is more often a product of the power 
(economic, legal, social, or other "endowments") that parties bring to the 
negotiation, and thus may not always reflect "principled" negotiation, prob-
lem-solving impulses, or even "fair trades. "81 For such critics, the use of private 
negotiation or now the more institutionalized forms of ADR (mediation, 
arbitration, and related processes) may be dangerous because there is no state 
supervision to ameliorate such power imbalances and to assure that important 
legal principles are followed. Issues of social differences in negotiated pro-
cesses, including race,82 gender,83 and class,84 have also called into question 
the idea that negotiation can really serve disempowered parties to create 
value or make better outcomes than they would receive in more formal le-
gal institutions. 
As a feminist, I have been a sympathetic participant in these critiques, but I 
have also argued the important point that alternatives to litigation must be 
measured against the fairness and power distributions in more conventional 
litigation venues. So, in various articles, I have talked about the "baseline" 
problem of being clear about what is being measured against what.8s In my 
parlance, "litigation romanticists" often presume equality of legal resources 
80. Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis 80 (Chicago, 1981). 
81. See, e.g., Tina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 Yale LJ. 
1545 (1991); Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale LJ. 1073 (1984); Richard Delgado et aI., 
Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
1985 Wis. L. Rev. 1359. 
82. Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 
Harv. L. Rev. 817 (1991). 
83. Deborah M. Kolb &Judith Williams, The Shadow Negotiation: How Women Can Master the 
Hidden Agendas That Determine Bargaining Success (New York, 2000). 
84. Iris Marion Young, Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy, 29 Pol. Theory 670 
(2001). 
85. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own: 
Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1871 (1997); Menkel-Meadow, 
supra note 74. 
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(both money and competency) or judges willing to step out of their passive 
role to ensure equal representation of all parties. Litigation, in my view, is no 
more likely than alternatives to litigation to produce complete "fairness." We 
do not yet have definitive empirical studies of these matters, as it is virtually 
impossible to subject the same case to two different treatments (litigation or 
some alternative) to test which outcomes are "better" (even if we could agree 
on appropriate metrics). Is a "better" or "fairer" solution one that tracks the 
law? Redistributes resources equitably among the parties? Maximizes joint 
gain for the parties? Causes the least harm to the parties or those outside the 
dispute? Or maximizes gain (or provides clearer precedent) for those outside 
of the dispute? Alas, in my view, while game theory permits easier measure-
ment of payoff schemes (especially in distributive games, but also in integra-
tive games), the real legal world must consider not only the game players, but 
also those affected by the game (the "human externalities" of any dispute) and 
the longer-term effects on the system itself. 
From Dyadic Negotiation to Mediation and Multiparty Processes 
It is precisely because I have argued that we will never be able to fully answer 
the question of whether litigation or particular forms of alternatives to litiga-
tion (and there are many of them) are always "better" or "fairer" or "morejust" 
that I have followed in the path of Lon Fuller, and my own sociological training, 
to suggest that it might give us greater explanatory purchase to study the 
conditions under which particular forms or institutions of process might be 
more advantageous than others. Thus, as the study of negotiated solutions 
expanded to suggest facilitated negotiation (mediation) when the parties are 
unable to craft their own solutions, I examined the different forms that 
mediation, like negotiation, might take in different contexts.86 
When parties negotiate (even when attempting to solve problems or maxi-
mize joint gain), they are still subject to a host of strategic problems (e.g., the 
giving and getting of information, whether and when to trust others, how 
quickly to come to agreement versus pursuing long-term or dynamic issues in 
a negotiation). The use of a third-party neutral to "manage" the negotiation 
process, to facilitate communication, and to aid in the crafting of solutions has 
increased the use and study of mediation in recent decades, even in the most 
conventional onegal matters. Whether used in the pure Fullerian case-types of 
ongoing relationships (business, labor, family) or now even in one-shot small 
claims matters in lower courts,87 mediation is used not only to facilitate 
communication and improve relations among the parties, but to prevent 
"waste" at the negotiation table and to produce more Pareto-optimal solutions. 
Like the efforts to categorize and generalize about different frameworks or 
mindsets in negotiation, mediation has also been subjected to efforts at 
taxonomies and typologies. Pure mediators are "facilitators" (of human com-
munication, negotiation techniques) but never "decide" anything for the 
86. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 73; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Negotiating with Lawyers, Men and 
Things: The Contextual Approach Still Matters, 17 Negot.J. 257 (2001). 
87. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 38. 
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parties (and are called therapeutic, by those outside of the field8S). More 
recently, at least in legal practice, it has been recognized that mediators, 
though not deciding anything, as third-party neutrals would in arbitration, 
may be "evaluators"S9 of parties' claims, arguments, and the likely legal out-
come should cases go to full adjudication before a judge or jury. Mediators 
often serve as reality testers, asking the parties to consider how realistic and 
reasonable their plans are for the enforcement of the agreement. Mediation, 
like negotiation, thus has the power to create relationships, rules, agreements, 
and plans for the future (unlike the backward focus of most court decisions). 
Efforts to demarcate various schools of mediation, such as "transformative 
mediation" ("recognition and empowerment" of parties differentiated from 
"problem-solving/settlement" of the dispute90), when deracinated from the 
context of the dispute or conflict, have seemed less useful to me than the 
deeper, contextually based analysis of earlier scholars like Fuller and Mentschi-
koff. There are different mediation technologies, techniques, practices, and 
approaches. For example, there are issues of more directive questioning; use 
of separate meetings or caucuses; whether mediators should be totally "neu-
tral" or merely "unbiased" or actually "enmeshed" in and knowledgeable 
about the dispute or disputants. The more interesting question to me has 
been whether there are universal or generalizable principles to be used in 
applying these techniques to particular disputes, or whether context must 
determine appropriate forms and techniques. In recent work I have explored 
this difficult question of the generalizability of our propositional knowledge 
bases with respect to particular forms of dispute resolution (e.g., the role of 
"deadline" and privacy in both domestic and international disputes91 ) and in 
particular contexts.92 And, as more fully explored below, issues of techniques, 
practices, and forms of participation may change depending on how many 
parties or stakeholders are engaged in a dispute or conflict and whether the 
conflict is a private matter (as in many but not all lawsuits) or a question of 
public import (as in multiple-party class actions or governmental regulation 
or public policy setting). 
The Morality and Legitimacy of Process: 
Macro and Micro Ethics Issues in Dispute Resolution 
The issues surrounding appropriate use of different forms of dispute and 
conflict resolution depend enormously, in my view, on the context. As various 
forms of ADR have been institutionalized and their animating principles or 
88. Susan S. Silbey & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 Law & pory 7 (1986). 
89. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A 
Grid for the Perplexed, 1 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 7 (1996). 
90. Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, The Promise of Mediation: Responding to 
Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition (San Francisco, 1994). 
91. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and Comparisons in International and Domestic 
Dispute Resolution, 18 Negot.J. 367 (2002); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and 
Contradictions in International and Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General 
Theory and Varied Contexts, 2003 J. Disp. Resol. 319. 
92. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 86. 
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sensibilities have been distorted,93 as in the importation of consensual dispute 
resolution forms to commanded and compulsory use in courts and con-
tracts,94 I have been raising issues about the appropriate regulations, rules, 
and standards95 that should be applied when legal dispute resolution conflates 
compulsory legal process and coerced participation with true consent and 
party self-determination.96 Using different kinds of dispute and conflict reso-
lution processes in different contexts (personal, organizational, contractual, 
voluntary, litigative, compulsory, court-annexed, private, public, international) 
presents enormous difficulties in different expectations of roles (for third 
parties, disputing parties, and their lawyers,97 and for duties owed to those 
affected by the dispute, as well as presenting concerns about the legitimacy of 
the processes used. While I have written a great deal about the specific issues 
of ethical practice in legal dispute resolution, including confidentiality, con-
flicts of interests, choice oflaws, fees, accountability and liability, competence, 
credentialing, and candor (and participated in the drafting of several model 
ethics codes98), it is not the specifics of rules that I most worry about. What I 
most worry about is the integrity of those seeking to help resolve conflict to 
choose appropriate processes for their matters and then to utilize those 
processes with a sense of integrity and fairness. In short, it is the foundational 
values, and intent of the parties, rather than the specific rules, that mat-
ter most.99 
If, as Lon Fuller suggested decades ago, each process has its own uses and 
"morality," then we must exert our best efforts in theory development and 
practice to study what the morality of each process should be. This project has 
become increasingly complex as the number of processes continues to in-
crease and hybridize (from mediation to med-arb, to early neutral evaluation 
in courts, to private mini trials, to public summary jury trials to minijury 
trials, to consensus building fora to facilitated policymaking and negotiated 
rule making), 100 thus making process-specific morality perhaps more difficult 
to elucidate. 
93. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: The Law of ADR, 19 
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1 (1991). 
94. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution Pro-
cesses: What's Happening and What's Not, 56 Miami L. Rev. 949 (2002); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, "Do the Haves Come Out Ahead" in Alternative Judicial Systems? Repeat Players in 
ADR, 15 Ohio St.]. on Disp. Resol. 19 (1999). 
95. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR: The Many "C's" of Professional Responsibility and 
Dispute Resolution, 28 Fordham Urb. LJ. 979 (2001). 
96. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-Adversarial Lawyering, 27 Fla. St. 
U. L. Rev. 153 (1999); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 85; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences 
of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: Lawyering as Only Adversary Practice, 10 
Geo.]. Legal Ethics 631 (1997). 
97. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR Representation: A Road Map of Critical Issues, 4 Disp. 
Resol. Mag. 3 (1997). 
98. See CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR, Proposed Model Rule 
for the Lawyer as Third Party Neutral (2002) and Principles for ADR Provider Organizations 
(2002), available at <http://www.cpradr.org>. 
99. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, And Now a Word About Secular Humanism, Spirituality and the 
Practice of Justice and Conflict Resolution, 28 Fordham Urb. LJ. 1073 (2001). 
100. Kathleen M. Scanlon, Drafter's Deskbook for Dispute Resolution Clauses (New York, 2002). 
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The Future of Dispute Processing and Conflict Resolution: Of Multiple 
Parties, Creative Solutions, and New Institutions for Resolving Conflict 
As the twenty-first century has begun with some of the most horrific and 
seemingly insoluble conflicts before us as human beings, beyond the indi-
vidual disputes and conflicts of lawsuits to "virtual" or "viral" conflicts both 
larger and more permeable than the nation-state, we will need all of the forms 
of conflict resolution we can muster to attempt a peaceful future for the 
human race. This seems a most propitious time for the further development 
of the field of conflict resolution. 
For me, the hope to solve problems through conflict resolution has always 
seemed a sort of optimistic sensibility or leitmotiv, informing the way I look at 
conflicts at both the individual and international level. Decades of interdisci-
plinary study have given me hope that we are continuing to make progress on 
some key concepts-that we cannot solve problems with an exclusive focus on 
self-interest or to~own command, but must consider the needs, interests, 
and participation of others with whom we come into contact. I believe and 
hope that there are possibilities to create solutions and resources in lieu of 
destroying them in our interactions with each other. We must "create wealth" 
in the sense of enhanced human well-being if we are to continue to inhabit the 
planet with others who materially have less than we do. Sometimes we will 
need help from wise intervenors, and those wise intervenors can develop more 
knowledge about what is effective in their practice. I also believe that, while we 
need experts to help in conflict resolution, being able to truly participate in 
the decisions that affect our lives is a human necessity for legitimate societal 
outcomes and for peaceful coexistence of people with divergent values, so 
there is some tension between the aspirations of democratic participation and 
expert facilitation in conflict resolution theory and practice. 
In the context of these large and general assertions there are many interest-
ing and concrete intellectual and practical projects to pursue. As we recognize 
that many disputes now involve multiple parties (if even only the insurer in a 
conventional two-party plaintiff-defendant lawsuit and the increased use of 
class actions in a variety of legal contexts) and many issues, negotiation 
theorists have appropriately turned their attention to development of theory 
for multiparty, multiissue negotiations (drawn from legal, business, political, 
and international disputes and conflicts), studying such issues as coalition 
formation, group dynamics, negotiation in dynamic settings, the role of lead-
ership and coordination, information processing, and the different dynamics 
of competition, collaboration, cooperation, and coordination in multiparty 
settings.101 This theory is currently being tested in such fora as negotiated rule 
making before administrative tribunals, in public policy settings,I02 in commu-
101. James K. Sebenius, Sequencing to Build Coalitions: With Whom Should I Talk First? in Wise 
Choices: Decisions, Games, and Negotiations, eds. Richard J. Zeckhauser et al. (Boston, 
1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 Yale LJ. 71 
(2000). 
102. Susan Carpenter & W. J. D. Kennedy, Managing Public Disputes: A Practical Guide for 
Professionals in Government, Business and Citizen Groups (San Francisco, 2001); Consen-
sus Building Handbook, supra note 46. 
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nity disputes, in truth and reconciliation commissions,103 in public conversa-
tions and dialog projects all over the world,104 as well as in new forms of 
conventional law courts, seeking multidisciplinary solutions to common prob-
lems (drugs, family dysfunction, etc.).!05 
My own theoretical work has come to focus on how interdisciplinary con-
flict resolution theory can be reunited with legal and political theory,jurispru-
dence, and constitutional law to explore how these newer forms of conflict 
resolution and dispute processing can become perhaps a fifth branch of 
governance (beyond executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative) to a 
form of ad hoc democracy of participation by the acted-upon that marries 
modern democratic discourse theory to conflict resolution theory.106 At the 
theoretical level, this work asks how we can form conflict resolution processes 
that enable all forms of human discourse to be "heard" in Hampshire's terms. 
Can we create "space" for human communication thaL simultaneously allows 
for expression of (1) reasons, principles, and persuasion, (2) preference 
trading and bargaining, and (3) passions, emotions, and beliefs, and that can 
find a way for such expressions to enrich our understandings of each other 
and find ways of solving specific problems? 
Can we find ways to address the more general problem of coexistence with 
varied and diverse needs and values?107 These are the future process and 
jurisprudential issues-how can we develop processes that allow in and legiti-
mate more than one form of discourse? Some new legal, governmental, and 
private processes are already experimenting with these multiple levels of 
discourse-negotiated rule making, problem-solving courts, and public con-
versations or dialogs to name a few. IDS New process institutions must be 
responsive to foundational process values of participation, assent, self-
determination, and mutual responsiveness and respect, while aspiring to 
achieve both peace and justice. Many international efforts, like those in simple 
legal dispute mediation, now proceed at both "informal" and "formal" levels 
simultaneously. Two-track diplomacy plays out in the international arena as 
caucuses are used in private mediation, exploring both bottom-up, informal, 
private, and task-oriented problem solving, with more formal, facilitated, or 
orchestrated public, transparent, and joint meetings. 
My own recent work attempts to organize and explicate the differences in 
process and process institutions that can be mapped according to the modes 
of discourse (principled reasons, bargaining, and emotions) and different 
103. Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and 
Mass Violence (Boston, 1998); Susan Collin Marks, Watching the Wind: Conflict Resolution 
During South Africa's Transition to Democracy (Washington, 2000); Forgiveness and 
Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy and Conflict Transformation, eds. Raymond G. 
Helmick & Rodney Lawrence Petersen (Philadelphia, 2001). 
104. See Search for Common Ground at <http://www.sfcg.org>. 
105. Kaye, supra note 48. 
106. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's Role in Deliberative Democracy (on file with author). 
107. Lederach, supra note 15; Ackerman & Duvall, supra note 16; Herding Cats, supra note 33. 
108. For some further examples, see Can·ie Menkel-Meadow, When Litigation Is Not the Only 
Way: Consensus Building and Mediation as Public Interest Lawyering, 10 Wash. U.J.L. and 
Poi'y, 37 (2002). 
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forms of process (open/closed; plenary/committee; expert facilitator / 
leaderless(naturalistic) for different.kinds of entities in conflict (permanent, 
constitutive, temporary/ad hoc), with some examples as indicated in the 
following chart. 
Modes of Conflict Resolution 
© 2002 Carrie Menkel-Meadow. Partially derived from categories specified by Jon Elster, Strategic Uses of 
Argument, in Barriers to Conflict Resolution, eds. Kenneth Arrow et al. (New York, (995). 
Mode of discourse Principles (reasons) Bargaining (interests) Passions (needs/ 
emotions/religion 
Forms of process 
Closed 
Open 
Plenary 
Committees 
Expert-Facilitator 
Naturalistic (leaderless) 
Permanent 
Some court Negotiation-U .S. 
proceedings; arbitration Constitution; diplomacy 
French Constitution; Public negotiations; 
courts; arbitration some labor 
French Constitution Regulation-negotiation 
or 
negotiated rule-making 
Faculty committees; U.S. Constitution/ 
task groups U.S. Congress 
Consensus building Minitrial 
Government, institutions Business organizations, 
unions 
Mediation 
(e.g., divorce) 
Dialog movement 
Town meetings 
Caucuses; interest groups 
Public conversations 
Grassroots organizing/ 
wro protests 
Religious organizations; 
Alcoholics Anonymous, 
Weight Watchers 
Constitutive U.N., national 
constitutions 
National constitutions/ Civil justice movements, 
professional associations peace 
Temporary/ad hoc Issue organizations/ 
social justice 
Interest groups 
Principles = reasons, appeals to universalism, law 
Bargaining = interests, preferences, trading, compromises 
Open = public or transparent meetings or proceedings 
Closed = confidential, secret process or even outcomes (settlements) 
Plenary = full group participation, joint meetings 
Committees= task groups, caucuses, parts of the whole 
Expert-facilitator = led by expertise (process or substantive or both) 
Naturalistic = leaderless, grassroots, ad hoc 
Permanent (organizational, institutional) 
Constitutive ("constitutional") 
Temporary/ad hoc groups or disputants 
Yippies, New Age, 
vigilantes 
At the substantive level, I think we have also learned that even in the largely 
generalist domain of law we need more multidisciplinary forms of problem 
solving. It is not enough to create new process institutions if we do not know 
what problems they are supposed to solve. In "Aha? Is Creativity Possible in 
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Legal Negotiation and Teachable in Legal Education?"109 I explore how new 
scientific work in creativityllo and multiple forms of human intelligencelll can 
be harnessed to legal problem solving to develop new legal concepts, tropes, 
entities, and solutions to legal problems if we can really learn to think outside 
of the box. Traditional legal thought, categories, remedies, and institutions 
have served us moderately well in the Anglo-American world, with well-
developed constitutional (both written and unwritten), common law, and 
statutory solutions to many intra- and inter-national legal disputes. But these 
institutions and ways of thinking have also been limiting. (Some are focused 
on the past and are not flexible enough to adapt to rapidly changing social, 
scientific, and political conditions; others are too binary in how "truth" is 
established and how remedies can be awarded; still others exclude too many 
of the people whose lives are affected by decisions taken on their behalf, 
whether truly "representative" or not.) Some of these processes may not 
appeal to our human need for healing, or spiritual or ethical "wholeness," or 
deeper values of human connection. 
In the parable of the good camping trip that we now use to teach the value 
of human diversity, we are asked to consider whom we would want to take on a 
moderately arduous trek through the mountains. Clearly we need a map 
reader, navigator, astronomer, cook, storyteller, medical expert, botanist, 
wood cutter, animal lover (and tamer or hunter, should we encounter hostile 
forms of animal life), strong pack carriers, and perhaps a musician or clergy 
person for the campfire at day's end. To whatever list any group makes up, I 
would now add a "conflict resolver" or "process expert" who would be able to 
handle, facilitate, and manage whatever internal conflicts such a diverse range 
of talent would inevitably encounter (until such time as all of us, as human 
beings, are "expert" in resolving our own conflicts, or at least have sufficient 
skills to do it on our own). We need many substantive (and creative) ap-
proaches to questions of survival; we also will need to coordinate how we reach 
solutions, answers, or agreements, even if they are only provisional, until 
dynamics change, or new information is learned. 
Just as legal dispute resolution has begun to evolve from traditional adver-
sary adjudication in the courts as the exclusive or preferred method for legal 
dispute resolution, human conflict resolution now requires a variety of sub-
stantive domains (science, physical, human, social, cultural, spiritual, artistic) 
to search for ways to create peace and justice. The outlines of new substantive 
ideas and solutions may still be obscure or illusory. The forms of process we 
can use to come together are more varied and interesting than ever before. 
We will need to develop new theory, experiment with new institutions, prac-
tices, and policies and then study and evaluate them for generalizability and 
applicability to new and different situations. Our very survival depends on it. 
What an exciting, if challenging, time· to be a conflict resolution theorist, 
teacher, practitioner, and "process architect." 
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